Fourthly, I conceive that those _actions_, which a man is said to do upon _deliberation_, are said to be _voluntary_, and done upon _choice_ and _election_, so that _voluntary_ action, and action proceeding from _election_ is the same thing; and that of a _voluntary agent_, it is all one to say, he is _free_, and to say, he hath not made an end of _deliberating_. Fifthly, I conceive _liberty_ to be rightly defined in this manner: _Liberty is the absence of all the impediments to action that are not contained in the nature and intrinsical quality of the agent_. As for example, the water is said to descend _freely_, or to have _liberty_ to descend by the channel of the river, because there is no impediment that way, but not across, because the banks are impediments. And though the water cannot ascend, yet men never say it wants the _liberty_ to ascend, but the _faculty_ or _power_, because the impediment is in the nature of the water, and intrinsical. So also we say, he that is tied, wants the _liberty_ to go, because the impediment is not in him, but in his bands; whereas we say not so of him that is sick or lame, because the impediment is in himself. Sixthly, I conceive that nothing taketh beginning from _itself_, but from the _action_ of some other immediate _agent_ without itself. And that therefore, when first a man hath an _appetite_ or _will_ to something, to which immediately before he had no appetite nor will, the _cause_ of his _will_, is not the _will_ itself, but _something_ else not in his own disposing. So that whereas it is out of controversy, that of _voluntary_ actions the _will_ is the _necessary_ cause, and by this which is said, the _will_ is also _caused_ by other things whereof it disposeth not, it followeth, that _voluntary_ actions have all of them _necessary_ causes, and therefore are _necessitated_. Seventhly, I hold that to be a _sufficient cause_, to which nothing is wanting that is needful to the producing of the _effect_. The same also is a _necessary_ cause. For if it be possible that a _sufficient_ cause shall not bring forth the _effect_, then there wanteth somewhat which was needful to the producing of it, and so the _cause_ was not _sufficient_; but if it be impossible that a _sufficient_ cause should not produce the _effect_, then is a _sufficient_ cause a _necessary_ cause, for that is said to produce an effect _necessarily_ that cannot but produce it. Hence it is manifest, that whatsoever is produced, is produced _necessarily_; for whatsoever is produced hath had a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, or else it had not been; and therefore also _voluntary_ actions are _necessitated_.