For the seventh point, which is, that all _events_ have _necessary_ causes, it is there proved, in that they have _sufficient_ causes. Further let us in this place also suppose any event never so casual, as the throwing, for example, _ames ace_ upon a pair of dice, and see, if it must not have been _necessary_ before it was thrown. For seeing it was thrown, it had a _beginning_, and consequently a _sufficient_ cause to produce it, consisting partly in the _dice_, partly in outward things, as the posture of the parts of the _hand_, the measure of _force_ applied by the caster, the posture of the parts of the _table_, and the like. In sum, there was nothing wanting which was necessarily requisite to the producing of that particular cast, and consequently the cast was necessarily thrown; for if it had not been thrown, there had wanted somewhat requisite to the throwing of it, and so the cause had not been _sufficient_. In the like manner it may be proved that every other accident, how _contingent_ soever it seem, or how _voluntary_ soever it be, is produced _necessarily_, which is that that my Lord Bishop disputes against. The same may be proved also in this manner. Let the case be put, for example, of the weather. _It is necessary that to-morrow it shall rain or not rain._ If therefore it be not _necessary_ it shall rain, it is _necessary_ it shall not rain, otherwise there is no necessity that the proposition, _it shall rain or not rain_, should be true. I know there be some that say, it may necessarily be true that one of the two shall come to pass, but not, singly that it shall rain, or that it shall not rain, which is as much to say, _one_ of them is _necessary_, yet neither of them is _necessary_; and therefore to seem to avoid that absurdity, they make a distinction, that neither of them is true _determinate_, but _indeterminate_; which distinction either signifies no more but this, one of them is true, but we know not which, and so the necessity remains, though we know it not; or if the meaning of the distinction be not that, it hath no meaning, and they might as well have said, one of them is true _Titirice_, but neither of them, _Tu patulice_. The last thing, in which also consisteth the whole controversy, namely that there is no such thing as an agent, _which when all things requisite to action are present, can nevertheless forbear to produce it_; or, which is all one, that there is no such thing as _freedom from necessity_, is easily inferred from that which hath been before alleged. For if it be an _agent_, it can _work_; and if it _work_, there is nothing wanting of what is requisite to produce the _action_, and consequently the cause of the action is _sufficient_; and if _sufficient_, then also _necessary_, as hath been proved before.