Lastly, that ordinary _definition_ of a _free agent_, namely, _that a_ free agent _is that, which, when all things are present which are needful to produce the_ effect, _can nevertheless not produce it_, implies a contradiction, and is nonsense; being as much as to say, the cause may be _sufficient_, that is to say, _necessary_, and yet the _effect_ shall not follow. ------- MY REASONS. For the first five points, wherein it is explicated I, what _spontaneity_ is; II, what _deliberation_ is; III, what _will_, _propension_, and _appetite_ are; IV, what a _free agent_ is: V, what _liberty_ is; there can no other proof be offered but every man’s own experience, by reflection on himself, and remembering what he useth in his mind, that is, what he himself meaneth when he saith an action is _spontaneous_, a man _deliberates_; such is his _will_, that _agent_ or that _action_ is _free_. Now he that reflecteth so on himself, cannot but be satisfied, that _deliberation_ is the _consideration of the good and evil sequels of an action to come_; that by _spontaneity_ is meant _inconsiderate action_, or else nothing is meant by it; that _will_ is the _last act of our deliberation_; that a _free agent_ is he _that can do if he will_, and _forbear if he will_; and that _liberty is the absence of external impediments_. But to those that out of custom speak not what they conceive, but what they hear, and are not able, or will not take the pains to consider what they think when they hear such words, no argument can be sufficient, because _experience_ and _matter of fact_ are not verified by other men’s arguments, but by every man’s own _sense_ and _memory_. For example, how can it be proved that to _love_ a thing and to think it _good_ is all one, to a man that doth not mark his own meaning by those words? Or how can it be proved that _eternity_ is not _nunc stans_, to a man that says those words by custom, and never considers how he can conceive the thing in his mind? Also the sixth point, that a man cannot imagine anything to begin _without a cause_, can no other way be made known, but by trying how he can imagine it; but if he try, he shall find as much reason, if there be no cause of the thing, to conceive it should begin at one time as another, that he hath equal reason to think it should begin at all times, which is impossible, and therefore he must think there was some special cause why it began then, rather than sooner or later; or else that it began never, but was _eternal_.