6. But if running through _many_ conclusions, we come to _none_ that are _absurd_, then we think the proposition _probable_; likewise we think probable whatsoever proposition we _admit_ for truth by error of reasoning, or from trusting to other men: and all such propositions as are admitted by _trust_ or error, we are not said to _know_, but to _think_ them to be true; and the admittance of them is called _opinion_. [Sidenote: Belief defined.] 7. And particularly, when the opinion is admitted out of _trust_ to _other_ men, they are said to _believe_ it; and their admittance of it is called _belief_, and sometimes _faith_. [Sidenote: Conscience defined.] 8. It is either _science_ or _opinion_ which we commonly mean by the word _conscience_: for men say that such and such a thing is true in or upon their conscience; which they _never_ do, when they think it _doubtful_; and therefore they _know_, or _think_ they know it to be true. But men, when they say things upon their conscience, are not therefore presumed certainly to know the truth of what they say; it remaineth then, that that word is used by them that have an _opinion_, _not_ only of the _truth_ of the thing, _but_ also of their _knowledge_ of it, to which the _truth_ of the proposition is consequent. _Conscience_ I therefore define to be _opinion of evidence_. [Sidenote: Belief, in some cases, no less from doubt than knowledge.] 9. _Belief_, which is the admitting of propositions upon _trust_, in many cases is no less free from _doubt_, than perfect and manifest _knowledge_: for as there is nothing whereof there is not some cause; so, when there is doubt, there must be some cause thereof conceived. Now there be many things which we receive from _report of others_, of which it is impossible to imagine any cause of _doubt_: for what can be opposed against the consent of all men, in things they can know, and have no cause to report otherwise than they are, such as is a great part of our _histories_, unless a man would say that all the world had _conspired_ to deceive him. And thus much of _sense_, _imagination_, _discursion_, _ratiocination_, and _knowledge_, which are the acts of our _power cognitive_, or _conceptive_. That power of the _mind_ which we call _motive_, differeth from the power _motive_ of the _body_; for the power _motive_ of the _body_ is that by which it _moveth other_ bodies, and we call _strength_: but the power motive of the _mind_, is that by which the mind giveth _animal motion_ to that _body_ wherein it existeth; the acts hereof are our _affections_ and _passions_, of which I am to speak in general. ------- CHAPTER VII. 1. Of delight, pain, love, hatred. 2. Appetite, aversion, fear. 3. Good, evil, pulchritude, turpitude. 4. End, fruition. 5. Profitable, use, vain. 6. Felicity. 7. Good and evil mixed. 8. Sensual delight, and pain; joy and grief.