knoweth as much as any other; supposing there needeth thereunto no study but that accrueth unto them by natural wit; though they play, or employ their mind otherwise in the purchase of wealth or place. The reason whereof is no other, than that in their writings and discourses they take for principles those opinions which are already vulgarly received, whether true or false; being for the most part false. There is therefore a great deal of _difference_ between _teaching_ and _persuading_; the sign of _this_ being _controversy_; the sign of the _former_, _no controversy_. 4. There be _two sorts_ of men that commonly be called _learned_: one is that sort that proceedeth _evidently_ from humble principles, as is described in the last section; and those men are called _mathematici_: _the other_ are they that _take up_ maxims from their _education_, and from the _authority_ of men, or of custom, and _take the habitual discourse of the tongue for ratiocination_; and these are called _dogmatici_. Now seeing in the last section those we call _mathematici_ are absolved of the crime of breeding controversy, and they that pretend not to learning cannot be accused, the fault lieth altogether in the _dogmatics_, that is to say, those that are imperfectly learned, and with passion press to have their opinions pass everywhere for truth, without any evident demonstration either from experience, or from places of Scripture of uncontroverted interpretation. 5. The expression of those conceptions which _cause_ in us the _experience_ of good while we deliberate, as also of those which cause our expectation of evil, is that which we call _counselling_, and is the internal deliberation of the mind concerning what we ourselves are to do or not to do. The _consequences_ of our actions are our _counsellors_, by _alternate succession_ in the mind. So in the counsel which a man taketh from _other_ men, the _counsellors alternately_ do _make appear the consequences_ of the action, and do not any of them deliberate, but furnish among them all, him that is counselled with arguments whereupon to deliberate with himself. 6. Another use of speech is _expression_ of _appetite_, _intention_, and _will_; as the appetite of knowledge by _interrogation_; appetite to have a thing done by another, as _request_, _prayer_, _petition_: expressions of our purpose or intention, as _promise_, which is the affirmation or negation of some action to be done in the future: _threatening_, which is the promise of evil; and _commanding_, which is that speech by which we signify to another our _appetite_ or desire _to have_ any _thing done_, or _left undone_, for reasons contained in the will itself: for it is not properly said, _Sic volo, sic jubeo_, without that other clause, _Stet pro ratione voluntas_: and when the command is a sufficient reason to move us to action, then is that command called a _law_.