The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
“Fifthly and lastly, I am sorry to hear a man of reason and parts to
compare the murdering of men with the slaughtering of brute beasts. The
elements are for the plants, the plants for the brute beasts, the brute
beasts for man. When God enlarged his former grant to man, and gave him
liberty to eat the flesh of his creatures for his sustenance, (Gen. ix.
3), yet man is expressly excepted (verse 6): _Whoso sheddeth man’s
blood, by man shall his blood be shed_. And the reason is assigned, _for
in the image of God made he man_. Before sin entered into the world, or
before any creatures were hurtful or noxious to man, he had dominion
over them as their lord and master. And though the possession of this
sovereignty be lost in part, for the sin of man, which made not only the
creatures to rebel, but also the inferior faculties to rebel against the
superior, from whence it comes that one man is hurtful to another; yet
the dominion still remains. Wherein we may observe how sweetly the
providence of God doth temper this cross; that though the strongest
creatures have withdrawn their obedience, as lions and bears, to shew
that man hath lost the excellency of his dominion, and the weakest
creatures, as flies and gnats, to shew into what a degree of contempt he
is fallen; yet still the most profitable and useful creatures, as sheep
and oxen, do in some degree retain their obedience.
(_i_) “The next branch of his answer concerns consultations, ‘which,’
saith he, ‘are not superfluous, though all things come to pass
necessarily, because they are the cause which doth necessitate the
effect, and the means to bring it to pass.’ We were told (No. XI.) ‘that
the last dictate of right reason was but as the last feather which
breaks the horse’s back. It is well yet, that reason hath gained some
command again, and is become at least a quarter-master. Certainly if any
thing under God have power to determine the will, it is right reason.
But I have shewed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will
physically, nor absolutely, much less extrinsically, and antecedently;
and therefore it makes nothing for that necessity which T. H. hath
undertaken to prove.