“Thirdly, (_p_) when brute creatures do learn any such qualities, it is not out of judgment, or deliberation, or discourse, by inferring or concluding one thing from another, which they are not capable of. Neither are they able to conceive a reason of what they do, but merely out of memory or out of a sensitive fear or hope. They remember that when they did after one manner, they were beaten; and when they did after another manner, they were cherished; and accordingly they apply themselves. But if their individual actions were absolutely necessary, fear or hope could not alter them. Most certainly, if there be any desert in it, or any praise due unto it, it is to them who did instruct them. Lastly, concerning arts, arms, books, instruments, study, physic, and the like, he answereth not a word more than what is already satisfied. And therefore I am silent. ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XIV. (_a_) “The first inconvenience is thus pressed. Those laws are unjust and tyrannical, which do prescribe things absolutely impossible in themselves to be done, and punish men for not doing of them.” I have already, in the beginning, where I recite the inconveniences that follow the doctrine of necessity, made clear that the same inconveniences follow not the doctrine of necessity, any more than they follow this truth, _whatsoever shall be, shall be_, which all men must confess; the same also followeth upon this, that _whatsoever God foreknows, cannot but come to pass in such time and manner as he hath foreknown it_. It is therefore evident that these inconveniences are not rationally deduced from those tenets. Again, it is a truth manifest to all men, that it is not in a man’s power to-day, to choose what will he shall have to-morrow, or an hour, or any time after. Intervening occasions, business, which the Bishop calls trifles, (trifles of which the Bishop maketh here a great business), do change the will. No man can say what he will do to-morrow, unless he foreknow, which no man can, what shall happen before to-morrow. And this being the substance of my opinion, it must needs be that when he deduceth from it, that counsels, arts, arms, medicines, teachers, praise, prayer, and piety, are in vain, that his deduction is false, and his ratiocination fallacy. And though I need make no other answer to all that he can object against me, yet I shall here mark out the causes of his several paralogisms.