yet proved as good a man; the more his praise, by how much the difficulty was the more to conform his disorderly appetite to right reason. “Concerning reward and punishment, he saith not a word, but only that they frame and conform the will to good, which hath been sufficiently answered. They do so indeed; but if his opinion were true, they could not do so. But because my aim is not only to answer T. H., but also to satisfy myself, (_o_) though it be not urged by him, yet I do acknowledge that I find some improper and analogical rewards and punishments used to brute beasts, as the hunter rewards his dog, the master of the decoy-duck whips her when she returns without company. And if it be true, which he affirmeth a little before that I have confessed, ‘that the actions of brute beasts are all necessitated and determined to that one thing which they shall do,’ the difficulty is increased. “But first, my saying is misalleged. I said, that some kinds of actions which are most excellent in brute beasts, and make the greatest show of reason, as the bees working their honey, and the spiders weaving their webs, are yet done without any consultation or deliberation, by a mere instinct of nature, and by a determination of their fancies to these only kinds of works. But I did never say, I could not say, that all their individual actions are necessary, and antecedently determined in their causes, as what days the bees shall fly abroad, and what days and hours each bee shall keep in the hive, how often they shall fetch in thyme on a day, and from whence. These actions and the like, though they be not free, because brute beasts want reason to deliberate, yet they are contingent, and therefore not necessary. “Secondly, I do acknowledge, that as the fancies of some brute creatures are determined by nature to some rare and exquisite works; so in others, where it finds a natural propension, art, which is the imitator of nature, may frame and form them according to the will of the artist to some particular actions and ends, as we see in setting-dogs, and coy-ducks, and parrots; and the principal means whereby they effect this, is by their backs or by their bellies, by the rod or by the morsel, which have indeed a shadow or resemblance of rewards and punishments. But we take the word here properly, not as it is used by vulgar people, but as it is used by divines and philosophers, for that recompense which is due to honest and dishonest actions. Where there is no moral liberty, there is neither honesty nor dishonesty, neither true reward nor punishment.