to them by fear of the sword that protecteth them, in that very act of receiving that protection, and not renouncing it openly, do oblige themselves to obey the laws of their protectors; to which, in receiving such protection, they have assented. And whereas he saith, the law of nature is a law without our assent, it is absurd; for the law of nature is the assent itself that all men give to the means of their own preservation. (_d_) “But his chiefest answer is, that an action forbidden, though it proceed from necessary causes, yet if it were done willingly, may be justly punished,” &c. This the Bishop also understandeth not, and therefore denies it. He would have the judge condemn no man for a crime, if it were necessitated; as if the judge could know what acts are necessary, unless he knew all that hath anteceded, both visible and invisible, and what both every thing in itself, and altogether, can effect. It is enough to the judge, that the act he condemneth be voluntary. The punishment whereof may, if not capital, reform the will of the offender; if capital, the will of others by example. For heat in one body doth not more create heat in another, than the terror of an example createth fear in another, who otherwise were inclined to commit injustice. Some few lines before, he hath said that I built upon a wrong foundation, namely, “that all magistrates were at first elective;” I had forgot to tell you, that I never said nor thought it. And therefore his reply, as to that point, is impertinent.