Not many lines after, for a reason why a man may not be justly punished when his crime is voluntary, he offereth this: “that law is unjust and tyrannical, which commands a man to will that which is impossible for him to will.” Whereby it appears, he is of opinion that a law may be made to command the will. The style of a law is _do this_, or _do not this_; or, _if thou do this, thou shalt suffer this_; but no law runs thus, _will this_, or _will not this_; or, _if thou have a will to this, thou shalt suffer this_. He objecteth further, that I beg the question, because no man’s will is necessitated. Wherein he mistakes; for I say no more in that place, but that he that doth evil willingly, whether he be necessarily willing, or not necessarily, may be justly punished. And upon this mistake he runneth over again his former and already answered nonsense, saying, “we ourselves, by our own negligence in not opposing our passions when we should and might, have freely given them a kind of dominion over us;” and again, _motus primo primi_, the first motions are not always in our power. Which _motus primo primi_, signifies nothing; and “our negligence in not opposing our passions,” is the same with “our want of will to oppose our will,” which is absurd; and “that we have given them a kind of dominion over us,” either signifies nothing, or that we have a dominion over our wills, or our wills a dominion over us, and consequently either we or our wills are not free. (_e_) “He pleads moreover that the law is a cause of justice,” &c. “All this is most true, of a just law justly executed.” But I have shown that all laws are just, as laws, and therefore not to be accused of injustice by those that owe subjection to them; and a just law is always justly executed. Seeing then that he confesseth that all that he replieth to here is true, it followeth that the reply itself, where it contradicteth me, is false. (_f_) “He addeth that the sufferings imposed by the law upon delinquents, respect not the evil act passed, but the good to come; and that the putting of a delinquent to death by the magistrate for any crime whatsoever, cannot be justified before God, except there be a real intention to benefit others by his example.” This he neither confirmeth nor denieth, and yet forbeareth not to discourse upon it to little purpose; and therefore I pass it over. (_g_) “First he told us, that it was the irresistible power of God that justifies all his actions; though he command one thing openly, and plot another thing secretly; though he be the cause not only of the action, but also of the irregularity, &c.”