His reply to this is, that he hath “showed sufficiently, that reason doth not determine the will physically,” &c. If not physically, how then? As he hath told us in another place, _morally_. But what it is to determine a thing morally, no man living understands. I doubt not but he had therefore the will to write this reply, _because_ I had answered his treatise concerning true liberty. My answer therefore was, at least in part, the _cause_ of his writing; yet that is the cause of the nimble local motion of his fingers. Is not the cause of local motion physical? His will therefore was physically, and extrinsically, and antecedently, and not morally caused by my writing. (_k_) “He adds further that ‘as the end is necessary, so are the means, and when it is determined that one thing shall be chosen before another, it is determined also for what cause it shall be so chosen.’ All which is truth, but not the whole truth,” &c. Is it not enough that it is truth? Must I put all the truth I know into two or three lines? No. I should have added, that God doth adapt and fit the means to their respective ends, free means to free ends, contingent means to contingent ends, necessary means to necessary ends. It may be I would have done so, but for shame. _Free_, _contingent_ and _necessary_ are not words that can be joined to _means_ or _ends_, but to _agents_ and _actions_; that is to say, to things that move or are moved: a _free agent_ being that whose motion or action is not hindered or stopped, and a _free action_, that which is produced by a free agent. A _contingent agent_ is the same with an _agent_ simply. But, because men for the most part think those things are produced without cause, whereof they do not see the cause, they use to call both the agent and the action contingent, as attributing it to fortune. And therefore, when the causes are necessary, if they perceive not the necessity, they call those necessary agents and actions, in things that have appetite, _free_; and in things inanimate, _contingent_. The rest of his reply to this point is very little of it applied to my answer. I note only that where he says, “but if God have so ordered the world, that a man cannot, _if he would_, neglect any means of good, &c.;” he would fraudulently insinuate that it is my opinion, that a man is not _free to do if he will, and to abstain if he will_. Whereas from the beginning I have often declared that it is none of my opinion; and that my opinion is only this, that he is not _free to will_, or which is all one, he is not master of his future will. After much unorderly discourse he comes in with “this is the doctrine that flows from this opinion of absolute necessity;” which is impertinent; seeing nothing flows from it more than may be drawn from the confession of an eternal prescience.