(_l_) “But he tells me in great sadness, that ‘my argument is no better than this; if I shall live till to-morrow, I shall live till to-morrow, though I run myself through with a sword to-day; which, saith he, is a false consequence, and a false proposition.’ Truly, if by running through, he understand killing, it is a false or rather a foolish proposition.” He saith right. Let us therefore see how it is not like to his. He says, “if it be absolutely necessary that a man shall live till to-morrow, then it is vain and superfluous for him to consult whether he should die to-day or not.” “And this,” he says, “is a true consequence.” I cannot perceive how it is a better consequence than the former; for if it be absolutely necessary that a man should live till to-morrow, and in health, which may also be supposed, why should he not, if he have the curiosity, have his head cut off to try what pain it is. But the consequence is false; for if there be a necessity of his living, it is necessary also that he shall not have so foolish a curiosity. But he cannot yet distinguish between a seen and an unseen necessity, and that is the cause he believeth his consequence to be good. (_m_) “The next branch of my argument concerns admonitions,” &c. Which he says is this: “If all things be necessary, then it is to no more purpose to admonish men of understanding, than fools, children, or madmen; but that they do admonish the one and not the other, is confessedly true; and no reason under heaven can be given for it but this, that the former have the use of reason and true liberty, with a dominion over their own actions, which children, fools, and madmen have not.” The true reason why we admonish men and not children, &c., is because admonition is nothing else but telling a man the good and evil consequences of his actions. They who have experience of good and evil, can better perceive the reasonableness of such admonition, than they that have not; and such as have like passions to those of the admonitor, do more easily conceive that to be good or bad which the admonitor saith is so, than they who have great passions, and such as are contrary to his. The first, which is want of experience, maketh children and fools unapt; and the second, which is strength of passion, maketh madmen unwilling to receive admonition; for children are ignorant, and madmen in an error, concerning what is good or evil for themselves. This is not to say children and madmen want true liberty, that is, the liberty to do as they will, nor to say that men of judgment, or the admonitor himself hath a dominion over his own actions, more than children or madmen, (for their actions are also voluntary), or that when he admonisheth he hath always the use of reason, though he have the use of deliberation, which children, fools, madmen, and beasts also have. There be, therefore, reasons under heaven which the Bishop knows not of.