In the rest of this reply he endeavoureth to prove, that it followeth from my opinion, that there is no use of piety. My opinion is no more than this, that a man cannot so determine to-day, the will which he shall have to the doing of any action to-morrow, as that it may not be changed by some external accident or other, as there shall appear more or less advantage to make him persevere in the will to the same action, or to will it no more. When a man intendeth to pay a debt at a certain time, if he see that the detaining of the money for a little longer may advantage himself, and seeth no other disadvantage equivalent likely to follow upon the detention, he hath his will changed by the advantage, and therefore had not determined his will himself; but when he foreseeth discredit or perhaps imprisonment, then his will remaineth the same, and is determined by the thoughts he hath of his creditor, who is therefore an external cause of the determination of the debtor’s will. This is so evident to all men living, though they never studied school-divinity, that it will be very strange if he draw from it the great impiety he pretends to do. Again, my opinion is only this: that whatsoever God foreknows shall come to pass, it cannot possibly be that that shall not come to pass; but that which cannot possibly not come to pass, that is said by all men to come to pass necessarily; therefore all events that God foreknows shall come to pass, shall come to pass necessarily. If therefore the Bishop draw impiety from this, he falleth into the impiety of denying God’s prescience. Let us see now how he reasoneth. (_b_) “First, he errs in making inward piety to consist merely in the estimation of the judgment. If this were so, what hinders but that the devils should have as much inward piety as the best Christians; for they esteem God’s power to be infinite, and tremble?”