The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
“In the second part of his answer, (_a_) he grants; that there are some
free agents, and some contingent agents, and that perhaps the beauty of
the world doth require it; but like a shrewd cow, which after she hath
given her milk casts it down with her foot, in the conclusion he tells
us, that nevertheless they are all necessary. This part of his answer is
a mere logomachy, as a great part of the controversies in the world are,
or a contention about words. What is the meaning of necessary, and free,
and contingent actions? I have showed before what free and necessary do
properly signify; but he misrecites it. He saith, I make all agents
which want deliberation, to be necessary; but I acknowledge that many of
them are contingent. (_b_) Neither do I approve his definition of
contingents, though he say I concur with him, that they are ‘such agents
as work we know not how’. For, according to this description, many
necessary actions should be contingent, and many contingent actions
should be necessary. The loadstone draweth iron, the jet chaff, we know
not how; and yet the effect is necessary; and so it is in all sympathies
and antipathies or occult qualities. Again, a man walking in the
streets, a tile falls down from a house, and breaks his head. We know
all the causes, we know how this came to pass. The man walked that way,
the pin failed, the tile fell just when he was under it; and yet this is
a contingent effect: the man might not have walked that way, and then
the tile had not fallen upon him. Neither yet do I understand here in
this place by contingents, such events as happen beside the scope or
intention of the agents; as when a man digging to make a grave, finds a
treasure; though the word be sometimes so taken. But by contingents, I
understand all things which may be done and may not be done, may happen
or may not happen, by reason of the indetermination or accidental
concurrence of the causes. And those same things which are absolutely
contingent, are yet hypothetically necessary. As supposing the passenger
did walk just that way, just at that time, and that the pin did fail
just then, and the tile fall; it was necessary that it should fall upon
the passenger’s head. The same defence will keep out his shower of rain.
But we shall meet with his shower of rain again, No. XXXIV; whither I
refer the further explication of this point.”
ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XVI.