(_c_) “That which he adds of a judge, is altogether impertinent as to his defence. Neither is a civil judge the proper judge, nor the law of the land a proper rule of sin.” A judge is to judge of voluntary crimes. He has no commission to look into the secret causes that make them voluntary. And because the Bishop had said the law cannot justly punish a crime that proceedeth from necessity, it was no impertinent answer to say, “the judge looks at no higher cause than the will of the doer”. And even this, as he saith, is enough to prove, that “the will of the doer did determine itself freely, and that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would”. To which I answer, that it proves indeed that the malefactor had liberty to have kept the law if he would; but it proveth not that he had the liberty to have a will to keep the law. Nor doth it prove that the will of the doer did determine itself freely; for, nothing can prove nonsense. But here you see what the Bishop pursueth in this whole reply, namely, to prove that a man hath liberty to do if he will, which I deny not; and thinks when he hath done that, he hath proved a man hath liberty to will, which he calls the will’s determining of itself freely. And whereas he adds, “a judge ought to look at all essential causes”; it is answer enough to say, he is bound to look at no more than he thinks he can see. (_d_) “Nature never intends the generation of a monster. If all the causes concur sufficiently, a perfect creature is produced; but by reason of the insufficiency, or debility, or contingent aberration of some of the causes, sometimes a monster is produced.” He had no sooner said this, but finding his error he retracteth it, and confesseth that “the causes of a monster were sufficient for the production of that which was produced, that is, of a monster; otherwise a monster had not been produced;” which is all that I intended by sufficiency of the cause. But whether every sufficient cause be a necessary cause or not, he meaneth to examine in No. XXXI. In the meantime he saith only, that liberty flows from the sufficiency, and contingency from the debility of the cause; and leaves out necessity, as if it came from neither. I must note also, that where he says nature never intends the generation of a monster, I understand not whether by nature he means the Author of nature, in which meaning he derogates from God; or nature itself, as the universal work of God; and then it is absurd; for the universe, as one aggregate of things natural, hath no intention. His doctrine that followeth concerning the generation of monsters, is not worth consideration; therefore I leave it wholly to the judgment of the reader.