“Next, they say, that the Stoics did hold an eternal flux and necessary connexion of causes; but they believed that God doth act _præter et contra naturam_, _besides and against nature_. I answer, that it is not much material whether they attribute necessity to God, or to the stars, or to a connexion of causes, so as they establish necessity. The former reasons do not only condemn the ground or foundation of necessity, but much more necessity itself upon what ground soever. Either they must run into this absurdity, that the effect is determined, the cause remaining undetermined; or else hold such a necessary connexion of causes as the Stoics did. “Lastly, they say, the Stoics did take away liberty and contingence, but they admit it. I answer, what liberty or contingence was it they admit but a titular liberty and an empty shadow of contingence, who do profess stiffly that all actions and events, which either are or shall be, cannot but be, nor can be otherwise, after any other manner, in any other place, time, number, order, measure, nor to any other end, than they are; and that in respect of God determining them to one. What a poor ridiculous liberty or contingency is this! “Secondly, they distinguish between the first cause, and the second causes; they say, that in respect of the second causes many things are free, but in respect of the first cause all things are necessary. This answer may be taken away two ways. “First, so contraries shall be true together; the same thing at the same time shall be determined to one, and not determined to one; the same thing at the same time must necessarily be, and yet may not be. Perhaps they will say, not in the same respect. But that which strikes at the root of this question is this, if all the causes were only collateral, this exception might have some colour: but where all the causes being joined together, and subordinate one to another, do make but one total cause, if any one cause (much more the first) in the whole series or subordination of causes be necessary, it determines the rest, and without doubt makes the effect necessary. Necessity or liberty is not to be esteemed from one cause, but from all the causes joined together. If one link in a chain be fast, it fastens all the rest.