The Bishop, supposing I had taken my opinion from the authority of the Stoic philosophers, not from my own meditation, falleth into dispute against the Stoics: whereof I might, if I pleased, take no notice, but pass over to No. XIX. But that he may know I have considered their doctrine concerning fate, I think fit to say thus much, that their error consisteth not in the opinion of fate, but in feigning of a false God. When therefore they say, _fatum est effatum Jovis_, they say no more but that _fate is the word of Jupiter_. If they had said it had been the word of the true God, I should not have perceived anything in it to contradict; because I hold, as most Christians do, that the whole world was made, and is now governed by the word of God, which bringeth a necessity of all things and actions to depend upon the Divine disposition. Nor do I see cause to find fault with that, as he does, which is said by Lipsius, that (_a_) fate is a _series or order of causes depending upon the Divine counsel_; though the divines thought he came too near the rocks, as he thinks I do now. And the reason why he was cautelous, was, because being a member of the Romish Church he had little confidence in the judgment and lenity of the Romish clergy; and not because he thought he had over-shot himself. (_b_) “Concerning the other distinction, of liberty in respect of the first cause, and liberty in respect of the second causes, though he will not see that which it concerned him to answer, &c.”, “as, namely, that the faculty of willing, &c.” I answer, that distinction he allegeth, not to be mine, but the Stoics’; and therefore I had no reason to take notice of it; for he disputeth not against me, but others. And whereas he says, _it concerned me to make_ that answer which he hath set down in the words following; I cannot conceive how it concerneth me (whatsoever it may do somebody else) to speak absurdly.