I said that the first cause is a necessary cause of all the effects that are next and immediate to it; which cannot be doubted, and though he deny it, he does not disprove it. For when he says, “those things which God wills without himself, he wills freely and not necessarily”; he says rashly, and untruly. Rashly, because there is nothing without God, who is _infinite_, in whom _are all things_, and in whom _we live, move, and have our being_; and untruly, because whatsoever God foreknew from eternity, he willed from eternity, and therefore necessarily. But against this he argueth thus: “Whatsoever cause acts or works necessarily, doth work or act all that it can do, or all that is in its power; but it is evident that God doth not all things which he can do,” &c. In things inanimate, the action is always according to the extent of its power; not taking in the power of willing, because they have it not. But in those things that have will, the action is according to the whole power, will and all. It is true, that God doth not all things that he can do if he will; but that he can _will_ that which he hath not _willed_ from all eternity, I deny; unless that he can not only _will a change_, but also _change his will_, which all divines say is immutable; and then they must needs be necessary effects, that proceed from God. And his texts, _God could have raised up children unto Abraham_, &c.; and _sent twelve legions of angels_, &c., make nothing against the necessity of those actions, which from the first cause proceed _immediately_. NO. XIX. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] _J. D._ “Thirdly, they distinguish between liberty from compulsion, and liberty from necessitation. The will, say they, is free from compulsion, but not free from necessitation. And this they fortify with two reasons. First, because it is granted by all divines, that hypothetical necessity, or necessity upon a supposition, may consist with liberty. Secondly, because God and the good angels do good necessarily, and yet are more free than we. To the first reason, I confess that necessity upon a supposition may sometimes consist with true liberty, as when it signifies only an infallible certitude of the understanding in that which it knows to be, or that it shall be. But if the supposition be not in the agent’s power, nor depend upon anything that is in his power; if there be an exterior antecedent cause which doth necessitate the effect; to call this free, is to be mad with reason.