The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, Volume 05 (of 11)
Thomas Hobbes · en
I deny not but that it is a free act of the Romish priest to vow
continence, not upon the supposition that he was a Romish priest, but
because he had not done it unless he would; if he had not been a Romish
priest, it had been all one to the freedom of his act. Nor is his
priesthood anything to the necessity of his vow, saving that if he would
not have vowed he should not have been made a priest. There was an
antecedent necessity in the causes extrinsical; first, that he should
have the will to be a priest, and then consequently that he should have
the will to vow. Against this he allegeth nothing. Then for his cat, the
man’s running from it is a free act, as being voluntary, and arising
from a false apprehension (which nevertheless he cannot help) of some
hurt or other the cat may do him. And therefore the act is as free as
the act of him that throweth his goods into the sea. So likewise the act
of Jacob in blessing his sons, and the act of Balaam in blessing Israel,
are equally free and equally voluntary, yet equally determined by God,
who is the author of all blessings, and framed the will of both of them
to bless, and whose will, as St. Paul saith, cannot be resisted.
Therefore both their actions were necessitated equally; and, because
they were voluntary, equally free. As for Caiphas’ his prophecy, which
the text saith _he spake not of himself_, it was necessary; first,
because it was by the supernatural gift of God to the high-priests, as
sovereigns of the commonwealth of the Jews, to speak to the people as
from the mouth of God, that is to say, to prophecy; and secondly,
whensoever he did speak not as from God, but as from himself, it was
nevertheless necessary he should do so, not that he might not have been
silent if he would, but because his will to speak was antecedently
determined to what he should speak from all eternity, which he hath yet
brought no argument to contradict.
He approveth my modesty in suspending my judgment concerning the manner
how the good angels do work, necessarily or freely, because I find it
not set down in the articles of our faith, nor in the decrees of our
Church. But he useth not the same modesty himself. For whereas he can
apprehend neither the nature of God nor of angels, nor conceive what
kind of thing it is which in them he calleth will, he nevertheless takes
upon him to attribute to them _liberty of exercise_, and to deny them _a
liberty of specification_; to grant them a _more intensive_ liberty than
we have, but not a _more extensive_; using, not incongruously, in the
incomprehensibility of the subject incomprehensible terms, as _liberty
of exercise_ and _liberty of specification_, and degrees of intension in
liberty; as if one liberty, like heat, might be more intensive than
another. It is true that there is greater liberty in a large than in a
straight prison, but one of those liberties is not more intense than the
other.