(_p_) “His other objection against this distinction of the acts of the will into _elicite_ and _imperate_, is obscurity. ‘Might it not,’ saith he, ‘have been as easily said in English, a voluntary action.’ Yes, it might have been said as easily, but not as truly, nor properly. Whatsoever hath its original from the will, whether immediately or mediately, whether it be a proper act of the will itself, as to elect, or an act of the understanding, as to deliberate, or an act of the inferior faculties or of the members, is a voluntary action: but neither the act of reason, nor of the senses, nor of the sensitive appetite, nor of the members, are the proper acts of the will, nor drawn immediately out of the will itself; but the members and faculties are applied to their proper and respective acts by the power of the will. “And so he comes to cast up the total sum of my second reason with the same faith that the unjust steward did make his accounts (Luke xvi). ‘The sum of J. D.’s distinction is,’ saith he, ‘that a voluntary act may be done on compulsion,’ (just contrary to what I have maintained), ‘that is to say, by foul means: but to will that or any act, cannot be but by allurement or fair means.’ I confess the distinction is mine, because I use it; as the sun is mine, or the air is mine, that is common to me with all who treat of this subject. (_q_) But his mistakes are so thick, both in relating my mind and his own, that the reader may conclude he is wandered out of his known way. I will do my duty to show him the right way. First, no acts which are properly said to be compelled, are voluntary. Secondly, acts of terror, (which he calls foul means), which are sometimes in a large improper sense called compulsory actions, may be, and for the most part are, consistent with true liberty. Thirdly, actions proceeding from blandishments or sweet persuasions, (which he calls fair means), if they be indeliberated, as in children who want the use of reason, are not presently free actions. Lastly, the strength of consequent and deliberated desires doth neither diminish guilt, nor excuse from punishment, as just fears of extreme and imminent dangers threatened by extrinsical agents often do; because the strength of the former proceeds from our own fault, and was freely elected in the causes of it; but neither desires nor fears, which are consequent and deliberated, do absolutely necessitate the will. ANIMADVERSIONS UPON THE BISHOP’S REPLY NO. XX.