(_l_) “Lastly, he tells us, that _the will doth choose of necessity, as well as the fire burns of necessity_. If he intend no more but this, that election is the proper and natural act of the will, as burning is of the fire &c., he speaks truly, but most impertinently; for the question is not now of the elective power, _in actu primo_, &c.” Here again he makes me to speak nonsense. I said, “the man chooseth of necessity”; he says I say, “the will chooseth of necessity”. And why: but because he thinks I ought to speak as he does, and say as he does here, that “election is the act of the will”. No: election is the act of a man, as power to elect is the power of a man. Election and will are all one act of a man; and the power to elect, and the power to will, one and the same power of a man. But the Bishop is confounded by the use of calling by the name of will, the power of willing in the future; as they also were confounded, that first brought in this senseless term of _actus primus_. My meaning is, that the election I shall have of anything hereafter, is now as necessary, as that the fire, that now is and continueth, shall burn any combustible matter thrown into it hereafter: or to use his own terms, the will hath no more power to suspend its willing, than the burning of the fire to suspend its burning: or rather more properly, the man hath no more power to suspend his will, than the fire to suspend its burning. Which is contrary to that which he would have, namely, that a man should have power to refuse what he wills, and to suspend his own appetite. For to refuse what one willeth, implieth a contradiction; the which also is made much more absurd by his expression. For he saith, the will hath power to refuse what it wills, and to suspend its own appetite: whereas _the will_, and _the willing_, and _the appetite_ is the same thing. He adds that “even the burning of the fire, if it be considered as it is invested with all particular circumstances, is not so necessary an action as T. H. imagineth”. He doth not sufficiently understand what I imagine. For I imagine, that of the fire which shall burn five hundred years hence, I may truly say now, it shall burn necessarily; and of that which shall not burn then, (for fire may sometimes not burn the combustible matter thrown into it, as in the case of the three children), that it is necessary it shall not burn. (_m_) “Two things are required to make an effect necessary: first that it be produced by a necessary cause, &c.: secondly, that it be necessarily produced, &c.” To this I say nothing, but that I understand not how a cause can be necessary, and the effect not be necessarily produced.