means, human will with the sensitive appetite, rational hope or fear with irrational passions, inclinations with intentions, a beginning of being with a beginning of working, sufficiency with efficiency. So as the greatest difficulty is to find out what he aims at. So as I had once resolved not to answer this part of his discourse; yet upon better advice I will take a brief survey of it also; and show how far I assent unto, or dissent from that which I conceive to be his meaning. “And first, concerning sudden passions, as anger or the like. (_e_) That which he saith, that ‘the action doth necessarily follow the thought’, is thus far true; that those actions which are altogether undeliberated and do proceed from sudden and violent passions, or _motus primo primi_, which surprise a man, and give him no time to advise with reason, are not properly and actually in themselves free, but rather necessary actions; as when a man runs away from a cat or a custard out of a secret antipathy. (_f_) “Secondly, as for those actions ‘wherein actual deliberation seems not necessary, because never anything appeared that could make a man doubt of the consequence’: I do confess, that actions done by virtue of a precedent deliberation, without any actual deliberation in the present, when the act is done, may notwithstanding be truly both voluntary and free acts, yea, in some cases and in some sense, more free than if they were actually deliberated of in present. As one who hath acquired by former deliberation and experience a habit to play upon the virginals, needs not deliberate what man or what jack he must touch, nor what finger of his hand he must move to play such a lesson; yea, if his mind should be fixed, or intent to every motion of his hand, or every touch of a string, it would hinder his play, and render the action more troublesome to him. Wherefore I believe, that not only his playing in general, but every motion of his hand, though it be not presently deliberated of, is a free act, by reason of his precedent deliberation. So then (saving improprieties of speech, as calling that voluntary which is free, and limiting the will to the last appetite; and other mistakes, as that no act can be said to be without deliberation) we agree also for the greater part in this second observation.