Besides, I see it is reasonable to punish a rash action; which could not be justly done by man, unless the same were voluntary. For no action of a man can be said to be without deliberation, though never so sudden; because it is supposed he had time to deliberate all the precedent time of his life, whether he should do that kind of action or not. And hence it is, that he that killeth in a sudden passion of anger, shall nevertheless be justly put to death: because all the time wherein he was able to consider whether to kill were good or evil, shall be held for one continual deliberation; and consequently the killing shall be judged to proceed from election. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.] J. D. “This part of T. H.’s discourse hangs together like a sick man’s dreams. (_a_) Even now he tells us, that ‘a man may have time to deliberate, yet not deliberate’. By and by he saith, that ‘no action of a man, though never so sudden, can be said to be without deliberation’. He tells us, No. XXXIII., that ‘the scope of this section is to show what is spontaneous’. Howbeit he showeth only what is voluntary; (_b_) so making voluntary and spontaneous to be all one; whereas before he had told us, that ‘every spontaneous action is not voluntary, because indeliberate; nor every voluntary action spontaneous, if it proceed from fear.’ (_c_) Now he tells us, that ‘those actions which follow the last appetite, are voluntary; and where there is one only appetite, that is the last’. But before he told us, that ‘voluntary presupposeth some precedent deliberation and meditation of what is likely to follow, both upon the doing and abstaining from the action’. (_d_) He defines liberty, No. XXIX., to be ‘the absence of all extrinsical impediments to action’. And yet in his whole discourse he laboureth to make good, that whatsoever is not done, is therefore not done, because the agent was necessitated by extrinsical causes not to do it. Are not extrinsical causes, which determine him not to do it, extrinsical impediments to action? So no man shall be free to do any thing but that which he doth actually. He defines a free agent to be ‘him who hath not made an end of deliberating’ (No. XXVIII.). And yet defines liberty to be ‘an absence of outward impediments’. There may be outward impediments, even whilst he is deliberating. As a man deliberates whether he shall play at tennis: and at the same time the door of the tennis-court is fast locked against him. And after a man hath ceased to deliberate, there may be no outward impediments: as when a man resolves not to play at tennis, because he finds himself ill-disposed, or because he will not hazard his money. So the same person, at the same time, should be free and not free, not free and free. And as he is not firm to his own grounds, so he confounds all things, the mind and the will, the estimative faculty and the understanding, imagination with deliberation, the end with the