him? “It is”, saith he, “an inquiry made by reason, whether this or that definitely considered, be a good and fit means; or indefinitely, what are good and fit means to be chosen for attaining some wished end.” If it were not his custom to say, the understanding understandeth, the will willeth, and so of the rest of the faculties, I should have believed that when he says deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, he meaneth an inquiry made by the man that reasoneth; for so it will be sense. But the reason which a man useth in deliberation, being the same thing that is called deliberation, his definition that deliberation is an inquiry made by reason, is no more than if he had said, deliberation is an inquiry made by deliberation; a definition good enough to be made by a Schoolman. Nor is the rest of the definition altogether as it should be; for there is no such thing as an “indefinite consideration of what are good and fit means”; but a man imagining first one thing, then another, considereth them successively and singly each one, whether it conduceth to his ends or not. NO. XXVII. _T. H._ Thirdly, I conceive, that in all deliberations, that is to say, in all alternate succession of contrary appetites, the last is that which we call the will, and is immediately before the doing of the action, or next before the doing of it become impossible. All other appetites to do and to quit, that come upon a man during his deliberation, are usually called intentions and inclinations, but not wills; there being but one will, which also in this case may be called last will, though the intention change often. [Sidenote: The Bishop’s reply.]