And because such power is in God only, he must needs be just in all his actions. And we, that not comprehending his counsels, call him to the bar, commit injustice in it. I am not ignorant of the usual reply to this answer, by distinguishing between will and permission. As, that God Almighty does indeed permit sin sometimes, and that he also foreknoweth that the sin he permitteth shall be committed; but does not will it, nor necessitate it. I know also they distinguish the action from the sin of the action, saying, God Almighty doth indeed cause the action, whatsoever action it be, but not the sinfulness or irregularity of it, that is, the discordance between the action and the law. Such distinctions as these dazzle my understanding. I find no difference between the will to have a thing done, and the permission to do it, when he that permitteth it can hinder it, and knows it will be done unless he hinder it. Nor find I any difference between an action that is against the law, and the sin of that action. As for example, between the killing of Uriah, and the sin of David in killing Uriah. Nor when one is cause both of the action and of the law, how another can be cause of the disagreement between them, no more than how one man making a longer and shorter garment, another can make the inequality that is between them. This I know, God cannot sin, because his doing a thing makes it just, and consequently no sin: and because whatsoever can sin is subject to another’s law, which God is not. And therefore it is blasphemy to say, God can sin. But to say, that God can so order the world as a sin may be necessarily caused thereby in a man, I do not see how it is any dishonour to him. Howsoever, if such or other distinctions can make it clear that St. Paul did not think Esau’s or Pharaoh’s actions proceeded from the will and purpose of God, or that proceeding from his will could not therefore without injustice be blamed or punished, I will, as soon as I understand them, turn unto J. D.’s opinion. For I now hold nothing in all this question between us, but what seemeth to me not obscurely, but most expressly said in this place by St. Paul. And thus much in answer to his places of Scripture. _J. D._ T. H. thinks to kill two birds with one stone, and satisfy two arguments with one answer, whereas in truth he satisfieth neither. First, for my third reason. (_a_) Though all he say here were as true as an oracle; though punishment were an act of dominion, not of justice in God; yet this is no sufficient cause why God should deny his own act, or why he should chide or expostulate with men, why they did that which he himself did necessitate them to do, and whereof he was the actor more than they, they being but as the stone, but he the hand that threw it. Notwithstanding anything which is pleaded here, this stoical opinion doth stick hypocrisy and dissimulation close to God, who is truth itself.