_L._ A court of justice is that which hath cognizance of such causes as are to be ended by the positive laws of the land; and a court of equity is that, to which belong such causes as are to be determined by equity; that is to say, by the law of reason. _P._ You see then that the difference between injustice and iniquity is this; that injustice is the transgression of a statute-law, and iniquity the transgression of the law of reason. But perhaps you mean by common-law, not the law itself, but the manner of proceeding in the law, as to matter of fact, by twelve men, freeholders; though those twelve men are no court of equity, nor of justice, because they determine not what is just or unjust, but only whether it be done or not done; and their judgment is nothing else but a confirmation of that which is properly the judgment of the witnesses. For to speak exactly, there cannot possibly be any judge of fact besides the witnesses. _L._ How would you have a law defined? _P._ Thus; a law is the command of him or them that have the sovereign power, given to those that be his or their subjects, declaring publicly and plainly what every of them may do, and what they must forbear to do. _L._ Seeing all judges in all courts ought to judge according to equity, which is the law of reason, a distinct court of equity seemeth to me to be unnecessary, and but a burthen to the people, since common-law and equity are the same law. _P._ It were so indeed, if judges could not err; but since they may err, and that the King is not bound to any other law but that of equity, it belongs to him alone to give remedy to them that, by the ignorance or corruption of a judge, shall suffer damage. _L._ By your definition of a law, the King’s proclamation under the Great Seal of England is a law; for it is a command, and public, and of the sovereign to his subjects. _P._ Why not, if he think it necessary for the good of his subjects? For this is a maxim at the common-law alleged by Sir Edward Coke himself, (I Inst. sect. 306), _Quando lex aliquid concedit, concedere videtur et id per quod devenitur ad illud_. And you know out of the same author, that divers Kings of England have often, to the petitions in Parliament which they granted, annexed such exceptions as these, _unless there be necessity, saving our regality_; which I think should be always understood, though they be not expressed; and are understood so by common lawyers, who agree that the King may recall any grant wherein he was deceived. _L._ Again, whereas you make it of the essence of a law to be publicly and plainly declared to the people, I see no necessity for that. Are not all subjects bound to take notice of all acts of Parliament, when no act can pass without their consent?