He does greater injury, that does it first, or alone, or with few; and he that does it often. Greater injury is that, against which laws and penalties were first made. And that, which is more brutal or more approaching to the actions of beasts. And that, which is done upon more premeditation. And by which more laws are broken. And which is done in the place of execution. And which is of greatest shame to him that receives the injury. And which is committed against well deservers. And which is committed against the _unwritten_ law; because good men should observe the law for justice, and not for fear of punishment. And which is committed against the _written_ law; because he that will do injury, neglecting the penalty set down in the _written_ law, is much more likely to transgress the _unwritten_ law, where there is no penalty at all. ========== CHAPTER XVI. OF PROOFS INARTIFICIAL. Of _artificial proofs_ we have already spoken. _Inartificial proofs_, which we invent not, but make use of, are of five sorts. 1. _Laws._ And those are _civil_ or _written law_: the _law or custom of nations_; and the _universal law of nature_. 2. _Witnesses._ And those are such as concern _matter_, and such as concern _manners_. Also they be _ancient_ or _present_. 3. _Evidences_ or writings. 4. _Question_ or torture. 5. _Oaths._ And those be either _given_ or _taken_, or both, or neither. For _laws_, we use them thus: when the _written law_ makes against us, we appeal to the _law of nature_, alleging that to be greatest justice, which is greatest equity. That the _law of nature_ is immutable, the _written law_ mutable. That the _written law_ is but seeming justice; the _law of nature_ very justice; and justice is among those things which are, and not which seem to be. That the judge ought to discern between true and adulterate justice. That they are better men that obey unwritten than written laws. That the law against us does contradict some other law. And when the law has a double interpretation, that is the true one which makes for us. And that the cause of the law being abolished, the law is no more of validity. But when the _written law_ makes for us, and _equity_ for the adversary, we must allege: That a man may use equity, not as a liberty to judge against the law; but only as a security against being forsworn, when he knows not the law. That men seek not equity because it is good simply, but because good for them. That it is the same thing not to make, and not to use the law. That as in other arts, and namely, in physic, fallacies are pernicious; so in a common-wealth it is pernicious to use pretexts against the law. And that in common-wealths well instituted, to seem wiser than the laws is prohibited.