For _witnesses_, we must use them thus. When we have them not, we must stand for _presumptions_, and say: That in equity, sentence ought to be given according to the most probability. That presumptions are the testimony of the things themselves, and cannot be bribed. That they cannot lie. When we have witnesses against him that has them not, we must say: That presumptions, if they be false, cannot be punished. That if presumptions were enough, witnesses were superfluous. For _writings_, when they favour us, we must say: That _writings_ are private and particular laws; and he that takes away the use of evidences, abolisheth the law. That since contracts and negociations pass by _writings_, he that bars their use dissolves human society. Against them, if they favour the adversary, we may say: That since laws do not bind that are fraudulently made to pass, much less writings; and that the judge being to dispense justice, ought rather to consider what is just than what is in the writing. That writings may be gotten by fraud or force, but justice by neither. That the writing is repugnant to some law, civil or natural; or to justice; or to honesty. That it is repugnant to some other writing, before or after. That it crosses some commodity of the judge; which must not be said directly, but implied cunningly. For the _torture_, if the giving of it make for us, we must say: That it is the only testimony that is certain. But if it make for the adversary, we may say: That men enforced by torture, speak as well that which is false as that which is true. That they, who can endure, conceal the truth; and they who cannot, say that which is false, to be delivered from pain. For _oaths_, he that will not put his adversary to his oath, may allege: That he makes no scruple to be forsworn. That by swearing he will carry the cause, which, not swearing, he must lose. That he had rather trust his cause in the hands of the judge, than of the adversary. He that _refuseth_ to take the oath may say: That the matter is not worth so much. That if he had been an evil man, he had _sworn_, and carried his cause. That to try it by _swearing_, for a religious man against an irreligious is as hard a match, as to set a weak man against a strong in combat. He that is _willing_ to take the oath, may pretend: That he had rather trust himself, than his adversary; and that it is equal dealing for an irreligious man to _give_, and for a religious man to _take_ the oath. That it is his duty to take the oath, since he has required to have _sworn judges_. He that _offers_ the oath, may pretend: That he does piously commit his cause to the Gods. That he makes his adversary himself judge. That it were absurd for him not to swear, that has required the judges to be sworn. And of these are to be compounded the forms we are to use, when we would _give_, and _not take_ the oath; or _take_ and _not give_; or _both give_ and _take_; or _neither give nor take_.