The fourth from the _authority of famous men_. As when a man shall say, that drunken men ought to be pardoned those acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the _objection_ may be, that _Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such acts a double punishment; one for the act, another for the drunkenness_. And forasmuch as all enthymemes are drawn from _probability_, or _example_, or from a _sign fallible_, or from a _sign infallible_: an enthymeme from _probability_ may be confuted _really_, by showing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but _apparently_ or _sophistically_, by showing only that it does not fall out so always; whereupon the judge thinks the _probability_ not sufficient to ground his sentence upon. The reason whereof is this, that the judge, while he hears the fact proved _probable_, conceives it as true. For the understanding has no object but _truth_. And therefore, by-and-by, when he shall hear _an instance_ to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it _true_, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it _false_, and consequently not so much as _probable_. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both _probable_ and _false_; and he that says a thing is _probable_, the meaning is, he thinks it _true_, but finds not arguments enough to prove it. An enthymeme, from a _fallible sign_, is answered by _showing_ the sign to be fallible. An enthymeme from an _example_, is answered as an enthymeme from _probability_; _really_ by showing _more examples_ to the contrary; _apparently_, if he bring _examples_ enough to make it seem _not necessary_. If the adversary have more examples than we, we must make it appear that they are not applicable to the case. An enthymeme from an _infallible_ sign, if the proposition be _true_, is unanswerable. ========== CHAPTER XXVIII. AMPLIFICATION AND EXTENUATION ARE NOT COMMON PLACES. ENTHYMEMES, BY WHICH ARGUMENTS ARE ANSWERED, ARE THE SAME WITH THOSE BY WHICH THE MATTER IN QUESTION IS PROVED OR DISPROVED. OBJECTIONS ARE NOT ENTHYMEMES. The first, that _amplification_ and _extenuation_ are not _common places_, appears by this, that amplification and extenuation do prove a fact to be _great_ or _little_; and are therefore enthymemes to be _drawn from_ common places, and therefore are not the _places_ themselves. The second, that enthymemes, by which arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other. The third, that an _objection_ is no _enthymeme_, is apparent by this, that an _objection_ is no more but an _opinion_, _example_, or other _instance_, produced to make appear that the adversary’s argument does not conclude.