_P._ Here again, you see, the King may deny or grant any petitions in Parliament, either as he thinks it necessary, as in this place, or as he thinks it prejudicial or not prejudicial to his royalty; as in the answer of the former petition, which is a sufficient proof that no part of his legislative power, or any other essential part of royalty, can be taken from him by a statute. Now seeing it is granted that equity is the same thing with the law of reason, and seeing Sir Edward Coke (1 _Inst._ sec. xxi.), defines equity to be a certain reason comprehended in no writing, but consisting only in right reason, which interpreteth and amendeth the written law; I would fain know to what end there should be any other Court of Equity at all, either before the Chancellor or any other person, besides the Judges of the Civil or Common Pleas? Nay, I am sure you can allege none but this, that there was a necessity for a higher Court of Equity than the Courts of common-law, to remedy the errors in judgment given by the justices of inferior courts; and the errors in Chancery were irrevocable, except by Parliament, or by special commission appointed thereunto by the King. _L._ But Sir Edward Coke says, that seeing matters of fact by the common-law are triable by a jury of twelve men, this court should not draw the matter _ad aliud examen_, that is, to another kind of examination, _viz._ deposition of witnesses, which should be but evidence to a jury. _P._ Is the deposition of witnesses any more or less, than evidence to the Lord Chancellor? It is not therefore another kind of examination; nor is a jury more capable of duly examining witnesses than a Lord Chancellor. Besides, seeing all courts are bound to judge according to equity, and that all judges in a case of equity may sometimes be deceived, what harm is there to any man, or to the state, if there be a subordination of judges in equity, as well as of judges in common-law? Seeing it is provided by an Act of Parliament, to avoid vexation, that _subpœnas_ shall not be granted till surety be found to satisfy the party so grieved and vexed for his damages and expenses, if so be the matter may not be made good which is contained in the bill. _L._ There is another statute of 31 _Hen. VI._ c. 2, wherein there is a proviso cited by Sir Edward Coke in these words: “_Provided that no matter determinable by the laws of the realm, shall be by the said Act determined in other form, than after the course of the same law in the King’s Courts, having the determination of the same law_.”