Against the fourteenth article, where I prove that the same body hath always the same magnitude, you object nothing but this, _that though it be granted, that the same body hath the same magnitude, while it resteth, yet I bring nothing to prove that when it changeth place, it may not also change its magnitude by being enlarged or contracted_. There is no doubt but to a body, whether at rest or in motion, more body may be added, or part of it taken away. But then it is not the same body, unless the whole and the part be all one. If the schools had not set your wit awry, you could never have been so stupid as not to see the weakness of such objections. That which you add in the end of your objections to this eighth chapter, _that I allow not Euclid this axiom gratis, that the whole is greater than a part_, you know to be untrue. At my eleventh chapter, you enter into dispute with me about the nature of proportion. Upon the truth of your doctrine therein, and partly upon the truth of your opinions concerning the definitions of a point, and of a line, dependeth the question whether you have any geometry or none; and the truth of all the demonstrations you have in your other books, namely of the _Angle of Contact_ , and _Arithmetica Infinitorum_. Here I say you enter, how you will get out, your reputation saved, we shall see hereafter. When a man asketh what proportion one quantity hath to another, he asketh how great or how little the one is comparatively to, or in respect of the other. When a geometrician prefixeth before his demonstrations a definition, he doth it not as a part of his geometry, but of natural evidence, not to be demonstrated by argument, but to be understood in understanding the language wherein it is set down; though the matter may nevertheless, if besides geometry he have wit, be of some help to his disciple to make him understand it the sooner. But when there is no significant definition prefixed, as in this case, where Euclid’s definition of proportion, that it is a _whatshicalt habitude of two quantities, &c._, is insignificant, and you allege no other, every one that will learn geometry, must gather the definition from observing how the word to be defined is most constantly used in common speech. But in common speech if a man shall ask how much, for example, is six in respect of four, and one man answer that it is greater by two, and another that it is greater by half of four, or by a third of six, he that asked the question will be satisfied by one of them, though perhaps by one of them now, and by the other another time, as being the only man that knoweth why he himself did ask the question. But if a man should answer, as you would do, that the proportion of six to two is of those numbers a certain quotient, he would receive but little satisfaction. Between the said answers to this question, how much is six in respect of four? there is this difference. He that answereth that it is more by