In the next place you say, I may as well conclude from the not susception of _greater_ and _less_, that a right angle is not quantity, but an oblique one is. Very learnedly. As if to be _greater_ or _less_, could be attributed to a quantity once determined. Number (that is, number indefinitively taken) is susceptible of _greater_ and _less_, because one number may be greater than another; and this is a good argument to prove that number is quantity. And do you think the argument the worse for this, that one six cannot be greater than another six? After all these childish arguments which you have hitherto urged, can you persuade any man, or yourselves, that you are logicians? To the fifth and sixth article you object, first, _that if I had before sufficiently defined_ (ratio) _proportion, I needed not again define what is_ (eadem ratio) _the same proportion_; and ask me _whether when I have defined_ man, _I use to define anew what is the_ same man? You think when you have the definition of _homo_, you have also the definition of _idem homo_, when it is harder to conceive what _idem_ signifies, than what _homo_. Besides, _idem_ hath not the same signification always, and with whatsoever it be joined; it doth not signify the same with _homo_, that it doth with _ratio_. For with _homo_ it signifies the same _individual man_, but with _ratio_ it signifies a like, or an equal proportion: and both (_ratio_) _proportion_ and (_idem_) _the same_, being defined, there will still be need of another definition for (_eadem ratio_) _the same proportion_; and this is enough to defend both myself and Euclid, against this objection: for Euclid also, after he had defined (_ratio_) _proportion_, and that sufficiently, as he believed, yet he defines _the same proportion_ again apart. I know you did not mean in this place to object anything against Euclid, but you saw not what you were doing. There is within you some special cause of intenebration, which you should do well to look to.