12. According to Locke present pleasures may be compared with future, and desire suspended till comparison has been made. 13. What is meant by ‘present’ and ‘future’ pleasure? By the supposed comparison Locke ought only to have meant the competition of pleasures equally present in imagination: 14.... and this could give no ground for responsibility. In order to do so, it must be understood as implying determination by conception of self. 15. Locke finds moral freedom in necessity of pursuing happiness. 16. If an action is moved by desire for an object, Locke asks no questions about origin of the object. But what is to be said of actions, which we only do because we ought? 17. Their object is pleasure, but pleasure given not by nature but by law. 18. Conformity to law not the moral good, but a means to it. 19. Hume has to derive from ‘impressions’ the objects which Locke took for granted. 20. Questions which he found at issue, _a_. Is virtue interested? _b_. What is conscience? 21. Hobbes’ answer to first question. 22. Counter-doctrine of Shaftesbury. Vice is selfishness; but no clear account of selfishness. 23. Confusion in his notions of self-good and public good; Is all living for pleasure, or only too much of it, selfish? 24. What have Butler and Hutcheson to say about it? Chiefly that affections terminate upon their objects; but this does not exclude the view that all desire is for pleasure. 25. Of moral goodness Butler’s account circular. Hutcheson’s inconsistent with his doctrine that reason gives no end. 26. Source of the moral judgment: received notion of reason incompatible with true view. Shaftesbury’s doctrine of rational affection; spoilt by doctrine of ‘moral sense’. 27. Consequences of the latter. 28. Is an act done for ‘virtue’s sake’ done for pleasure of moral sense? 29. Hume excludes every object of desire but pleasure. 30. His account of ‘direct passions’: all desire is for pleasure. 31. Yet he admits ‘passions’ which produce pleasure, but proceed not from it. 32. Desire for objects, as he understands it, excluded by his theory of impressions and ideas. 33. Pride determined by reference to self. 34. This means that it takes its character from that which is not a possible ‘impression’. 35. Hume’s attempt to represent idea of self as derived from impression. 36. Another device is to suggest a physiological account of pride. 37. Fallacy of this: it does not tell us what pride is to the subject of it. 38. Account of love involves the same difficulties; and a further one as to nature of sympathy. 39. Hume’s account of sympathy. 40. It implies a self-consciousness not reducible to impressions. 41. Ambiguity in his account of benevolence: it is a desire and therefore has pleasure for its object. What pleasure? 42. Pleasure of sympathy with the pleasure of another.