43. All ‘passions’ equally interested or disinterested. Confusion arises from use of ‘passion’ alike for desire and emotion. Of this Hume avails himself in his account of active pity. 44. Explanation of apparent conflict between reason and passion. 45. A ‘reasonable’ desire means one that excites little emotion. Enumeration of possible motives. 46. If pleasure sole motive, what is the distinction of self-love? Its opposition to disinterested desires, as commonly understood, disappears. It is desire for pleasure in general. 47. How Hume gives meaning to this otherwise unmeaning definition. ‘Interest,’ like other motives described, implies determination by reason. 48. Thus Hume, having degraded morality for the sake of consistency, after all is not consistent. 49. If all good is pleasure, what is moral good? Ambiguity in Locke’s view. 50. Development of it by Clarke, which breaks down for want of true view of reason. 51. With Hume, moral good is pleasure excited in a particular way, viz.; in the spectator of the ‘good’ act and by the view of its tendency to produce pleasure. 53. Moral sense is thus sympathy with pleasure qualified by consideration of general tendencies. 54. In order to account for the facts it has to become sympathy with unfelt feelings. 55. Can the distinction between the ‘moral’ and ‘natural’ be maintained by Hume? What is ‘artificial virtue’? 56. No ground for such distinction in relation between motive and act. 57. Motive to artificial virtues. 58. How artificial virtues become moral. 59. Interest and sympathy account for all obligations civil and moral. 60. What is meant by an action which ought to be done. 61. Sense of morality no motive: when it seems so the motive is really pride. 62. Distinction between virtuous and vicious motive does not exist for person moved. 63. ‘Consciousness of sin’ disappears. 64. Only respectability remains: and even this not consistently accounted for. GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO VOL. I. How the history of philosophy should be studied.