A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method Into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion — David Hume — John Shaqi
A Treatise of Human Nature: Being an Attempt to Introduce the Experimental Method Into Moral Subjects; and Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
David Hume · en
1. There is a view of the history of mankind, by this time
familiarised to Englishmen, which detaches from the chaos of events
a connected series of ruling actions and beliefs--the achievement of
great men and great epochs, and assigns to these in a special sense
the term ‘historical.’ According to this theory--which indeed, if
there is to be a theory of History at all, alone gives the needful
simplification--the mass of nations must be regarded as left in
swamps and shallows outside the main stream of human development.
They have either never come within the reach of the hopes and
institutions which make history a progress instead of a cycle, or
they have stiffened these into a dead body of ceremony and caste, or
at some great epoch they have failed to discern the sign of the times
and rejected the counsel of God against themselves. Thus permanently
or for generations, with no principle of motion but unsatisfied want,
without the assimilative ideas which from the strife of passions
elicit moral results, they have trodden the old round of war, trade,
and faction, adding nothing to the spiritual heritage of man. It
would seem that the historian need not trouble himself with them,
except so far as relation to them determines the activity of the
progressive nations.
Hume the last great English philosopher.
2. A corresponding theory may with some confidence be applied to
simplify the history of philosophical opinion. The common plan of
seeking this history in compendia of the systems of philosophical
writers, taken in the gross or with no discrimination except in
regard to time and popularity, is mainly to blame for the common
notion that metaphysical enquiry is an endless process of threshing
old straw. Such enquiry is really progressive, and has a real
history, but it is a history represented by a few great names.
At rare epochs there appear men, or sets of men, with the true
speculative impulse to begin at the beginning and go to the end, and
with the faculty of discerning the true point of departure which
previous speculation has fixed for them. The intervals are occupied
by commentators and exponents of the last true philosopher, if it has
been his mission to construct; if it has been sceptical, by writers
who cannot understand the fatal question that he has asked, and
thus still dig in the old vein which he had exhausted, and of which
his final dilemma had shown the bottom. Such an interval was that
which in the growth of continental philosophy followed on the epoch
of Leibnitz; an interval of academic exposition or formulation, in
which the system, that had been to the master an incomplete enquiry,
became in the hands of his disciples a one-sided dogmatism. In the
line of speculation more distinctively English, a like _régime_
of ‘strenua inertia’ has prevailed since the time of Hume. In the
manner of its unprofitableness, indeed, it has differed from the
Wolfian period in Germany, just as the disinterested scepticism of