57. Present sensation gives knowledge of existence. 58. Reasons why its testimony must be trusted. 59. How does this account fit Locke’s definition of knowledge? 60. Locke’s account of the testimony of sense renders his question as to its veracity superfluous. 61. Confirmations of the testimony turn upon the distinction between ‘impression’ and ‘idea’. 62. They depend on language which pre-supposes the ascription of sensation to an outward cause. 63. This ascription means the clothing of sensation with invented relations. 64. What is meant by restricting the testimony of sense to _present_ existence? 65. Such restriction, if maintained, would render the testimony unmeaning. 66. But it is not maintained: the testimony is to operation of permanent identical things. 67. Locke’s treatment of relations of cause and identity. 68. That from which he derives idea of cause pre-supposes it. 69. Rationale of this ‘petitio principii’. 70. Relation of cause has to be put into sensitive experience in order to be got from it. 71. Origin of the idea of identity according to Locke. 72. Relation of identity not to be distinguished from idea of it. 73. This ‘invented’ relation forms the ‘very being of things’. 74. Locke fails to distinguish between identity and mere unity. 75. Feelings are the real, and do not admit of identity. How then can identity be real? 76. Yet it is from reality that the idea of it is derived. 77. Transition to Locke’s doctrine of essence. 78. This repeats the inconsistency found in his doctrine of substance. 79. Plan to be followed. 80. What Locke understood by essence. 81. Only to nominal essences that general propositions relate, _i.e._ only to abstract ideas having no real existence. 82. An abstract idea may be a simple one. 83. How then is science of nature possible? 84. No ‘uniformities of phenomena’ can be known. 85. Locke not aware of the full effect of his own doctrine ... 86. ... which is to make the real an abstract residuum of consciousness. 87. Ground of distinction between actual sensation and ideas in the mind is itself a thing of the mind. 88. Two meanings of real essence. 89. According to one, it is a collection of ideas as qualities of a thing: 90. ... about real essence in this sense there may be general knowledge. 91. But such real essence a creature of thought. 92. Hence another view of real essence as unknown qualities of unknown body. 93. How Locke mixes up these two meanings in ambiguity about body. 94. Body as ‘parcel of matter’ without essence. 95. In this sense body is the mere individuum. 96. Body as qualified by circumstances of time and place. 97. Such body Locke held to be subject of ‘primary qualities’: but are these compatible with particularity in time? 98. How Locke avoids this question. 99. Body and its qualities supposed to be outside consciousness. 100. How can primary qualities be outside consciousness, and yet knowable?