101. Locke answers that they copy themselves in ideas--Berkeley’s rejoinder. Locke gets out of the difficulty by his doctrine of solidity. 102. In which he equivocates between body as unknown opposite of mind and body as a ‘nominal essence’. 103. Rationale of these contradictions. 104. What knowledge can feeling, even as referred to a ‘solid’ body, convey? 105. Only the knowledge that something is, not _what_ it is. 106. How it is that the real essence of things, according to Locke, perishes with them, yet is immutable. 107. Only about qualities of matter, as distinct from matter itself, that Locke feels any difficulty. 108. These, as knowable, must be our ideas, and therefore not a ‘real essence’. 109. Are the ‘primary qualities’ then, a ‘nominal essence’? 110. According to Locke’s account they are relations, and thus inventions of the mind. 111. Body is the complex in which they are found. Do we derive the idea of body from primary qualities, or the primary qualities from idea of body? 112. Mathematical ideas, though ideas of ‘primary qualities of body,’ have ‘barely an ideal existence’. 113. Summary view of Locke’s difficulties in regard to the real. 114. Why they do not trouble him more. 115. They re-appear in his doctrine of propositions. 116. The knowledge expressed by a proposition, though certain, may not be real ... 117. ... when the knowledge concerns substances. In this case general truth must be merely verbal. Mathematical truths, since they concern not substances, may be both general and real. 118. Significance of this doctrine. 119. Fatal to the notion that mathematical truths, though general, are got from experience: 120. ... and to received views of natural science: but Locke not so clear about this. 121. Ambiguity as to real essence causes like ambiguity as to science of nature. Particular experiment cannot afford general knowledge. 122. What knowledge it can afford, according to Locke. 123. Not the knowledge which is now supposed to be got by induction. Yet more than Locke was entitled to suppose it could give. 124. With Locke mathematical truths, though ideal, true also of nature. 125. Two lines of thought in Locke, between which a follower would have to choose. 126. Transition to doctrine of God and the soul. 127. Thinking substance--source of the same ideas as outer substance. 128. Of which substance is perception the effect? 129. That which is the source of substantiation cannot be itself a substance. 130. To get rid of the inner source of ideas in favour of the outer would be false to Locke. 131. The mind, which Locke opposes to matter, perpetually shifting. 132. Two ways out of such difficulties. ‘Matter’ and ‘mind’ have the same source in self-consciousness. 133. Difficulties in the way of ascribing reality to substance as matter, re-appear in regard to substance as mind. 134. We think not always, yet thought constitutes the self.