187. If they imply permanent relations, his theory properly excludes them. He supposes a divine decree that one feeling shall follow another. 188. Locke had explained reality by relation of ideas to outward body. Liveliness in the idea evidence of this relation. 189. Berkeley retains this notion, only substituting ‘God’ for ‘body’. 190. Not regarding the world as a system of intelligible relations, he could not regard God as the subject of it. 191. His view of the soul as ‘naturally immortal’. 192. Endless succession of feelings is not immortality in true sense. Berkeley’s doctrine of matter fatal to a true spiritualism: 193. ... as well as to a true Theism. His inference to God from necessity of a power to produce ideas; 194. ... a necessity which Hume does not see. A different turn should have been given to his idealism, if it was to serve his purpose. 195. Hume’s mission. His account of impressions and ideas. Ideas are fainter impressions. 196. ‘Ideas’ that cannot be so represented must be explained as mere words. 197. Hume, taken strictly, leaves no distinction between impressions of reflection and of sensation. 198. Locke’s theory of sensation disappears. Physiology won’t answer the question that Locke asked. 199. Those who think it will don’t understand the question. 200. Hume’s psychology will not answer it either. 201. It only seems to do so by assuming the ‘fiction’ it has to account for; by assuming that impression represents a real world. 202. So the ‘Positivist’ juggles with ‘phenomena’. 203. Essential difference, however, between Hume and the ‘Positivist’. 204. He adopts Berkeley’s doctrine of ideas, but without Berkeley’s saving suppositions, 205. ... in regard to ‘spirit’, 206. ... in regard to relations. His account of these. 207. It corresponds to Locke’s account of the sorts of agreement between ideas. 208. Could Hume consistently admit idea of relation at all? 210. Only in regard to identity and causation that he sees any difficulty. These he treats as fictions resulting from ‘natural relations’ of ideas: _i.e._ from resemblance and contiguity. 212. Is resemblance then an impression? 213. Distinction between resembling feelings and idea of resemblance. 214. Substances = collections of ideas. 215. How can ideas ‘in flux’ be collected? 216. Are there general ideas? Berkeley said, ‘yes and no’. 217. Hume ‘no’ simply. How he accounts for the appearance of there being such. 219. His account implies that ‘ideas’ are conceptions, not feelings. 220. He virtually yields the point in regard to the _predicate_ of propositions. 221. As to the subject, he equivocates between singleness of feeling and individuality of conception. 222. Result is a theory which admits predication, but only as singular. 223. All propositions restricted in same way as Locke’s propositions about real existence. 224. The question, how the _singular_ proposition is possible, the vital one.