135. Locke neither disguises these contradictions, nor attempts to overcome them. 136. Is the idea of God possible to a consciousness given in time? 137. Locke’s account of this idea. 138. ‘Infinity,’ according to Locke’s account of it, only applicable to God, if God has parts. 139. Can it be applied to him ‘figuratively’ in virtue of the indefinite number of His acts? 140. An act, finite in its nature, remains so, however often repeated. 141. God only infinite in a sense in which time is _not_ infinite, and which Locke could not recognize 142. --the same sense in which the self is infinite. 143. How do I know my own real existence?--Locke’s answer. 144. It cannot be known consistently with Locke’s doctrine of real existence. 145. But he ignores this in treating of the self. 146. Sense in which the self is truly real. 147. Locke’s proof of the real existence of God. There must have been something from eternity to cause what now is. 148. How ‘eternity’ must be understood if this argument is to be valid: 149. ... and how ‘cause’. 150. The world which is to prove an eternal God must be itself eternal. 151. But will the God, whose existence is so proven, be a thinking being? 152. Yes, according to the true notion of the relation between thought and matter. 153. Locke’s antinomies--Hume takes one side of them as true. 154. Hume’s scepticism fatal to his own premises. This derived from Berkeley. 155. Berkeley’s religious interest in making Locke consistent. 156. What is meant by relation of mind and matter? 157. Confusions involved in Locke’s materialism. 158. Two ways of dealing with it. Berkeley chooses the most obvious. 159. His account of the relation between visible and tangible extension. We do not see bodies without the mind ... 160. ... nor yet feel them. The ‘esse’ of body is the ‘percipi’. 170. What then becomes of distinction between reality and fancy? 171. The real = ideas that God causes. 172. Is it then a succession of feelings? 173. Berkeley goes wrong from confusion between thought and feeling. 174. Which, if idea = feeling, does away with space and body. 175. He does not even retain them as ‘abstract ideas’. 176. On the same principle all permanent relations should disappear. 177. By making colour = relations of coloured points, Berkeley represents relation as seen. 178. Still he admits that space is constituted by a succession of feelings. 179. If so, it is not space at all; but Berkeley thinks it is only not ‘pure’ space. _Space_ and _pure_ space stand or fall together. 180. Berkeley disposes of space for fear of limiting God. 181. How he deals with possibility of general knowledge. 182. His theory of universals ... 183. ... of value, as implying that universality of ideas lies in relation. 184. But he fancies that each idea has a positive nature apart from relation. 185. Traces of progress in his idealism. 186. His way of dealing with physical truths.