they say that he declares the things concerning the soul to be alone supremely good, but those of the body or external to it to be no longer supremely good, but only said to be so. And that these last are very often named intermediates also; for they can be used both well and ill. He says therefore that the virtues are extremes as to honour, but means as to substance.[119] For there is nothing more honourable than virtue; but that which goes beyond or falls short of these virtues ends in vice. For instance, he says that these are the four virtues, to wit, Prudence, Temperance, Justice, and Fortitude, and that there follow on each of these two vices of excess and deficiency respectively. Thus on Prudence follow thoughtlessness by deficiency and cunning by excess; on Temperance, intemperance by deficiency and sluggishness by excess; on Justice, over-modesty by deficiency and greediness by excess; and on Fortitude, [Sidenote: p. 37.] cowardice by deficiency and foolhardiness by excess.[120] And these virtues when inborn in a man operate for his perfection and give him happiness. But he says that happiness is likeness to God as far as possible. And that any one is like God when he becomes holy and just with intention. For this he supposes to be the aim of the highest wisdom and virtue.[121] But he says that the virtues follow one another in turn and are of one kind, and never oppose one another; but that the vices are many-shaped and sometimes follow and sometimes oppose one another.[122]