A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
“You know that I do not approach reasonable objections with the
intention merely of refuting them, but that in thinking them over I
always weave them into my judgments, and afford them the
opportunity of overturning all my most cherished beliefs. I
entertain the hope that by thus viewing my judgments impartially
from the standpoint of others some third view that will improve
upon my previous insight may be obtainable.... Long experience has
taught me that insight into a subject which I am seeking to master
is not to be forced, or even hastened, by sheer effort, but demands
a fairly prolonged period during which I return again and again to
the same concepts, viewing them in all their aspects and in their
widest possible connections, while in the intervals the sceptical
spirit awakens, and makes trial whether my conclusions can
withstand a searching criticism.”[6] “In mental labour of so
delicate a character nothing is more harmful than preoccupation
with extraneous matters. The mind, though not constantly on the
stretch, must still, alike in its idle and in its favourable
moments, lie uninterruptedly open to any chance suggestion which
may present itself. Relaxations and diversions must maintain its
powers in freedom and mobility, so that it may be enabled to view
the object afresh from every side, and so to enlarge its point of
view from a microscopic to a universal outlook that it adopts in
turn every conceivable standpoint, verifying the observations of
each by means of all the others.”[7] “I am not of the opinion of
the well-meaning writer who has recommended us never to allow
doubts in regard to a matter upon which we have once made up our
minds. In pure philosophy that is not feasible. Indeed the
understanding has in itself a natural objection to any such
procedure. We must consider propositions in all their various
applications; even when they may not seem to require a special
proof, we must make trial of their opposites, and in this way fight
for delay, until the truth becomes in all respects evident.”[8]