=Mind= (_Gemüt_) is a neutral term without metaphysical implications.[353] It is practically equivalent to the term which is substituted for it in the next paragraph, power of representation (_Vorstellungsfähigkeit_). =Representation= (_Vorstellung_) Kant employs in the widest possible meaning. It covers any and every cognitive state. The definition here given of =sensibility=--“the capacity (receptivity) to obtain representations through the mode in which we are affected by objects”--is taken directly over from the _Dissertation_.[354] In this definition, as in that of intuition, Kant, without argument or question, postulates the existence of independently existing objects. The existence of given sensations presupposes the existence of things in themselves. Sensibility is spoken of as the source both of objects and of intuitions. This is legitimate since object and intuition mutually imply one another; the latter is the apprehension of the former. By “objects” is obviously meant what in the third paragraph is called the matter of appearances, _i.e._ sensations in their objective aspect, as qualities or contents. The term “object” is similarly employed in the last line of this first paragraph. =Understanding= (_Verstand_) is defined only in its logical or discursive employment. Kant wisely defers all reference to its more fundamental synthetic activities. _In us_ (_bei uns_) is an indirect reference to the possibility of intellectual (non-sensuous) intuition which is further developed in other parts of the _Aesthetic_.[355] Sensuous intuition is due to affection by an object. In intellectual intuition the mind must produce the object in the act of apprehending it.[356] Kant’s definition of intuition applies, as already noted, only to empirical intuition. He proceeds[357] to define the relation in which =sensation= (_Empfindung_) stands to empirical intuition. What he here says amounts to the assertion that through sensation intuition acquires its object, _i.e._ that _sensation is the content of intuition_. And that being so, it is also through sensation that empirical intuition acquires its relation to the object (= thing in itself) which causes it. (That would seem to be the meaning of the ambiguous second sentence; but it still remains uncertain whether the opposition intended is to pure or to intellectual intuition.) If this interpretation of the paragraph be correct, sensation is counted as belonging exclusively to the content side of subjective apprehension. But Kant views sensation in an even more definite manner than he here indicates. Though sensation is given, it likewise involves a reaction of the mind. “Whatever is sensuous in knowledge depends upon the subject’s peculiar nature, in so far as it is capable of this or that modification upon the presence of the object.”[358]