Thus for Kant sensation is a modification or state of the subject, produced by affection through an object. The affection produces a modification or state of the subject, and this subjective modification is the sensation. “Sensation is a perception [_Perception_] which relates itself solely to the subject as the modification of its state.”[359] This view of sensation, as subjective, was universally held in Kant’s day. He accepts it without argument or question. That it could possibly be challenged never seems to have occurred to him. He is equally convinced that it establishes the existence of an actually present object. “Sensation argues the presence of something, but depends as to its quality upon the nature of the subject.”[360] “Sensation presupposes the actual presence of the object.”[361] Kant’s view of sensation, as developed in the _Aesthetic_,[362] thus involves three points: (1) It must be counted as belonging to the content side of mental apprehension. (2) Though a quality or content, it is purely subjective, depending upon the nature of our sensibility. (3) It is due to the action of some object upon the sensibility. Kant distinguishes between =sensation= (_Empfindung_) and =feeling= (_Gefühl_).[363] It had been usual to employ them as synonyms. “We understand by the word sensation an objective representation of the senses; and in order to preclude the danger of being misunderstood, we shall denote that which must always remain merely subjective and can constitute absolutely no representation of an object by the ordinary (_sonst üblichen_) term feeling.”[364] =Appearance= (_Erscheinung_) is here defined as the undetermined object of an intuition. By undetermined object is meant, as we have seen, the object in so far as it consists of the given sense contents. When these contents are interpreted through the categories they become _phenomena_. “Appearances so far as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories are called phenomena.”[365]