A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
There is no mention of this argument in the first edition of the
_Critique_, and when it reappears in the _Prolegomena_ it is interpreted
in the light of an additional premiss, and is made to yield a very
different conclusion from that drawn in the _Dissertation_, and a
_directly opposite conclusion_ from that drawn in 1768. Instead of being
employed to establish either the intuitive character of space or its
absolute existence, it is cited as evidence in proof of its
subjectivity. As in 1768, it is spoken of as strange and paradoxical,
and many of the previous illustrations are used. The paradox consists in
the fact that bodies and spherical figures, conceptually considered, can
be absolutely identical, and yet for intuition remain diverse. This
paradox, Kant now maintains[631] in opposition to his 1768 argument,
proves that such bodies and the space within which they fall are not
independent existences. For were they things in themselves, they would
be adequately cognisable through the pure understanding, and could not
therefore conflict with its demands. Being conceptually identical, they
would necessarily be congruent in every respect. But if space is merely
the form of sensibility, the fact that in space the part is only
possible through the whole will apply to everything in it, and so will
generate a fundamental difference between conception and intuition.[632]
Things in themselves are, as such, unconditioned, and cannot, therefore,
be dependent upon anything beyond themselves. The objects of intuition,
in order to be possible, must be merely ideal.
Now the new premiss which differentiates this argument from that of
1768, and which brings Kant to so opposite a conclusion, is one which is
entirely out of harmony with the teaching of the _Critique_. In this
section of the _Prolegomena_ Kant has unconsciously reverted to the
dogmatic standpoint of the _Dissertation_, and is interpreting
understanding in the illegitimate manner which he so explicitly
denounces in the section on _Amphiboly_.
“The mistake ... lies in employing the understanding contrary to
its vocation transcendentally [_i.e._ transcendently] and in making
objects, _i.e._ possible intuitions, conform to concepts, not
concepts to possible intuitions, on which alone their objective
validity rests.”[633]