=I. Concerning Logic in General.=--This _Introduction_[639] which falls into four divisions, is extremely diffuse, and contributes little that is of more than merely architectonic value. It is a repetition of the last section of the general _Introduction_, and of the introductory paragraphs of the _Aesthetic_, but takes no account of the definitions given in either of those two places. It does not, therefore, seem likely that it could have been written in immediate sequence upon the _Aesthetic_. It is probably later than the main body of the _Analytic_.[640] In any case it is externally tacked on to it; as Adickes has noted,[641] it is completely ignored in the opening section of the _Analytic_.[642] In treating of intuition in the first sentence, Kant seems to have in view only empirical intuition.[643] Yet he at once proceeds to state that intuition may be pure as well as empirical.[644] Also, in asserting that “pure intuition contains only the form under which something is intuited,” Kant would seem to be adopting the view that it does not yield its own manifold, a conclusion which he does not, however, himself draw. In defining sensibility,[645] Kant again ignores pure intuition. Sensuous intuition, it is stated, is the mode in which we are affected by objects.[646] Understanding, in turn, is defined only in its opposition to sensibility, in the ordinary meaning of that term. Understanding is the faculty which yields thought of the object to which sense-affection is due. It is “the power of thinking the object of sensuous intuition”; and acts, it is implied, in and through pure concepts which it supplies out of itself. “Without sensibility objects would not be given to us [_i.e._ the impressions, in themselves merely subjective contents, through which alone independent objects can be revealed to us, would be wanting]; without understanding they would not be thought by us [_i.e._ they would be apprehended only in the form in which they are given, viz. as subjective modes of our sensibility].” Kant has not yet developed the thesis which the central argument of the _Analytic_ is directed to prove, namely, that save through the combination of intuition and conception no consciousness whatsoever is possible. In these paragraphs he still implies that though concepts without intuition are empty they are not meaningless, and that though intuitions without concepts are blind they are not empty.[647] Their union is necessary for genuine knowledge, but not for the existence of consciousness as such. “It is just as necessary to make our concepts sensuous, _i.e._ to add to them their object in intuition, as to make our intuitions intelligible, _i.e._ to bring them under concepts.”