Kant’s final Critical teaching is very different from this. Concepts are not first given in their purity, nor is “their object” added in intuition. Only through concepts is apprehension of an object possible, and only in and through such apprehension do concepts come to consciousness. Nor are intuitions “made intelligible” by being “brought under concepts.” Only as thus conceptually interpreted can they exist for consciousness. The co-operation of concept and intuition is necessary for consciousness in any and every form, even the simplest and most indefinite. Consciousness of the subjective is possible only in and through consciousness of the objective, and _vice versa_. The dualistic separation of sensibility from understanding persists, however, even in Kant’s later utterances; and, as above stated,[648] to this sharp opposition are due both the strength and the weakness of Kant’s teaching. Intuition and conception must, he here insists, be carefully distinguished. _Aesthetic_ is the “science of the rules of sensibility in general.” _Logic_ is the “science of the rules of understanding in general.” Kant’s classification of the various kinds of logic[649] may be exhibited as follows: { pure { general { applied Logic { special { transcendental Adickes[650] criticises Kant’s classification as defective, owing to the omission of the intermediate concept ‘ordinary.’ Adickes therefore gives the following table: Logic =========================================== || | ||transcendental | ordinary || |_________________________ || | | || | special | general || | |_______________ || | | | || | | pure | applied || | | | General logic is a logic of elements, _i.e._ of the absolutely necessary laws of thought, in abstraction from all differences in the objects dealt with, _i.e._ from all content, whether empirical or transcendental. It is a canon of the understanding in its general discursive or analytic employment. When it is pure, it takes no account of the empirical psychological conditions under which the understanding has to act. When it is developed as an applied logic, it proceeds to formulate rules for the employment of understanding under these subjective conditions. It is then neither canon, nor organon, but simply a catharticon of the ordinary understanding. Special logic is the organon of this or that science, _i.e._ of the rules governing correct thinking in regard to a certain class of objects. Only pure general logic is a pure doctrine of reason. It alone is absolutely independent of sensibility, of everything empirical, and therefore of psychology. Such pure logic is a body of demonstrative teaching, completely _a priori_. It stands to applied logic in the same relation as pure to applied ethics.