=II. Concerning Transcendental Logic.=--It is with the distinction between general and transcendental logic that Kant is chiefly concerned. It is a distinction which he has himself invented, and which is of fundamental importance for the purposes of the _Critique_. Transcendental logic is the new science which he seeks to expound in this second main division of the _Doctrine of Elements_. The distinction, from which all the differences between the two sciences follow, is that while general logic abstracts from all differences in the objects known, transcendental logic abstracts only from empirical content. On the supposition, not yet proved by Kant, but asserted in anticipation, that there exist pure _a priori_ concepts which are valid of objects, there will exist a science distinct in nature and different in purpose from general logic. The two logics will agree in being _a priori_, but otherwise they will differ in all essential respects. The reference in A 55 = B 79 to the forms of intuition is somewhat ambiguous. Kant might be taken as meaning that in transcendental logic abstraction is made not only from everything empirical but also from all intuition. That is not, however, Kant’s real view, or at least not his final view. In sections A 76-7 = B 102, A 130-1 = B 170, and A 135-6 = B 174-5, which are probably all of later origin, he states his position in the clearest terms. Transcendental logic, he there declares, differs from general logic in that it is not called upon to abstract from the pure _a priori_ manifolds of intuition.[655] This involves, it may be noted, the recognition, so much more pronounced in the later developments of Kant’s Critical teaching, of space and time as not merely forms for the apprehension of sensuous manifolds but as themselves presenting to the mind independent manifolds of _a priori_ nature. As the term _transcendental_ indicates, the new logic will have as its central problems the origin, scope, conditions and possibility of valid _a priori_ knowledge of objects. None of these problems are treated in general logic, which deals only with the understanding itself. The question which it raises is, as Kant says in his _Logic_,[656] _How can the understanding know itself?_ The question dealt with by transcendental logic we may formulate in a corresponding way: _How can the understanding possess pure a priori knowledge of objects?_ It is a canon of pure understanding in so far as that faculty is capable of synthetic, objective knowledge _a priori_.[657] General logic involves, it is true, the idea of reference to objects,[658] but the possibility of such reference is not itself investigated. In general logic the understanding deals only with itself. It assumes indeed that all objects must conform to its laws, but this assumption plays no part in the science itself.