Opening the text
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'

Kant · en
A further point, not here dwelt upon by Kant, calls for notice, namely,
that the activities of understanding dealt with by general logic are its
merely discursive activities,--those of discrimination and comparison;
whereas those dealt with by transcendental logic are the originative
activities through which it produces _a priori_ concepts from within
itself, and through which it attains, independently of experience, to an
_a priori_ determination of objects. Otherwise stated, general logic
deals only with analytic thinking, transcendental logic with the
synthetic activities that are involved in the generation of the complex
contents which form the subject matter of the analytic procedure.

=III. Concerning the Division of General Logic into Analytic and
Dialectic.=[659]--The following passage from Kant’s _Logic_[660] forms an
excellent and sufficient comment upon the first four paragraphs of this
section:

     “An important perfection of knowledge, nay, the essential and
     inseparable condition of all its perfection, is truth. Truth is
     said to consist in the agreement of knowledge with the object.
     According to this merely verbal definition, then, my knowledge, in
     order to be true, must agree with the object. Now I can only
     compare the object with my knowledge by this means, namely _by
     having knowledge of it_. My knowledge, then, is to be verified by
     itself, which is far from being sufficient for truth. For as the
     object is external to me, I can only judge whether my knowledge of
     the object agrees with my knowledge of the object. Such a circle in
     explanation was called by the ancients Diallelos. And, indeed, the
     logicians were accused of this fallacy by the sceptics, who
     remarked that this account of truth was as if a man before a
     judicial tribunal should make a statement, and appeal in support of
     it to a witness whom no one knows, but who defends his own
     credibility by saying that the man who had called him as a witness
     is an honourable man. The charge was certainly well-founded. The
     solution of the problem referred to is, however, absolutely
     impossible for any man.

     “The question is in fact this: whether and how far there is a
     certain, universal, and practically applicable criterion of truth.
     For this is the meaning of the question, What is truth?...