A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
Hume and Leibniz are thus the two protagonists that dwarf all others.
They realised as neither Malebranche, Locke, nor Berkeley, neither Reid,
Lambert, Crusius, nor Mendelssohn ever did, the really crucial issues
which must ultimately decide between the competing possibilities. Each
maintained, in the manner prescribed by his general philosophy, one of
what then appeared to be the only two possible views of the function of
thought. The alternatives were these: (_a_) Thought is merely a
practical instrument for the convenient interpretation of our human
experience; it has no objective or metaphysical validity of any kind;
(_b_) Thought legislates universally; it reveals the wider universe of
the eternally possible; and prior to all experience can determine the
fundamental conditions to which that experience must conform. Or to
interpret this opposition in logical terms: (_a_) The fundamental
principles of experience are synthetic judgments in which no relation is
discoverable between subject and predicate, and which for that reason
can be justified neither _a priori_ nor by experience; (_b_) all
principles are analytic, and can therefore be justified by pure thought.
The problem of Kant’s _Critique_, broadly stated, consists in the
examination and critical estimate of these two opposed views. There is
no problem, scientific, moral, or religious, which is not vitally
affected by the decision which of these alternatives we are to adopt, or
what reconciliation of their conflicting claims we hope to achieve.
Since Kant’s day, largely owing to the establishment of the evolution
theory, this problem has become only the more pressing. The
naturalistic, instrumental view of thought seems to be immensely
reinforced by biological authority. Thought would seem to be reduced to
the level of sense-affection, and to be an instrument developed through
natural processes for the practical purposes of adaptation. Yet the
counter-view has been no less powerfully strengthened by the victorious
march of the mathematical sciences. They have advanced beyond the limits
of Euclidean space, defining possibilities such as no experience reveals
to us. The Leibnizian view has also been reinforced by the successes of
physical science in determining what would seem to be the actual,
objective character of the independently real. Kant was a rationalist by
education, temperament, and conviction. Consequently his problem was to
reconcile Leibniz’s view of the function of thought with Hume’s proof of
the synthetic character of the causal principle. He strives to
determine how much of Leibniz’s belief in the legislative power of pure
reason can be retained after full justice has been done to Hume’s
damaging criticisms. The fundamental principles upon which all
experience and all knowledge ultimately rest are _synthetic_ in nature:
how is it possible that they should also be _a priori_? Such is the
problem that was Kant’s troublous inheritance from his philosophical