A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' — Kant — John Shaqi
A Commentary to Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason'
Kant · en
Lastly, the _a priori_ factors are purely relational. They have no
inherent content from which clues bearing on the supersensible can be
obtained. Their sole function is to serve in the interpretation of
contents otherwise supplied.
The _a priori_, then, is merely relational, without inherent content; it
is synthetic, and therefore incapable of independent or metaphysical
proof; it is relative to an experience which is only capable of yielding
appearances. The _a priori_ is as merely factual as the experience which
it conditions.
Even in the field of morality Kant held fast to this conviction.
Morality, no less than knowledge, presupposes _a priori_ principles.
These, however, are never self-evident, and cannot be established by any
mere appeal to intuition. They have authority only to the extent to
which they can be shown to be the indispensable presuppositions of a
moral consciousness that is undeniably actual.[25]
That the _a priori_ is of this character must be clearly understood.
Otherwise the reader will be pursued by a feeling of the unreality, of
the merely historical or antiquarian significance, of the entire
discussion. He may, if he pleases, substitute the term formal or
relational for _a priori_. And if he bears in mind that by the
relational Kant is here intending those elements in knowledge which
render possible the relations constitutive of _meaning_, he will
recognise that the Critical discussion is by no means antiquated, but
still remains one of the most important issues in the entire field of
philosophical enquiry.
2. KANT’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC
The above conclusions have an important bearing upon logical doctrine.
Just as modern geometry originates in a sceptical treatment of the axiom
of parallels, so modern, idealist logic rests upon Kant’s demonstration
of the revolutionary consequences of Hume’s sceptical teaching. If
principles are never self-evident, and yet are not arrived at by
induction from experience, by what alternative method can they be
established? In answer to this question, Kant outlines the position
which is now usually entitled the _Coherence_ theory of truth.[26] That
theory, though frequently ascribed to Hegel, has its real sources in the
_Critique of Pure Reason_. It expresses that modification in the
Leibnizian rationalism which is demanded by Hume’s discovery of the
synthetic character of the causal axiom. Neither the deductive methods
of the Cartesian systems nor the inductive methods of the English
philosophies can any longer be regarded as correctly describing the
actual processes of scientific proof.